The Anatomy of a Moral Panic: Western Mainstream Media’s Russia Scapegoat by Simons, G.
Changing Societies & Personalities, 2019
Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 189–206
http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/csp.2019.3.3.071
Received 28 July 2019 © 2019 Gregory Simons 
Accepted 13 September 2019 gregmons@yahoo.com 
Published online 5 October 2019 
ARTICLE
The Anatomy of a Moral Panic:  
Western Mainstream Media’s Russia Scapegoat
Greg Simons
Uppsala University, Sweden
 Turiba University, Latvia
Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russia
ABSTRACT
Since 2014, there has been a very concerted campaign launched by 
the neo-liberal Western mainstream mass media against Russia. The 
format and content suggest that this is an attempt to induce a moral 
panic among the Western publics. It seems to be intended to create 
a sense of fear and to switch the logic to a series of emotionally-
based reactions to assertion propaganda. Russia has been variously 
blamed for many different events and trends around the world, such 
as the “destroying” of Western “democracy”, and democratic values. 
In many regards, Russia is projected as being an existential threat in 
both the physical and intangible realms. This paper traces the strategic 
messages and narratives of the “Russia threat” as it is presented in 
Western mainstream media. Russia is connoted as a scapegoat for 
the failings of the neo-liberal democratic political order to maintain its 
global hegemony; therefore, Russia is viewed as the “menacing” other 
and a desperate measure to halt this gradual decline and loss of power 
and influence. This ultimately means that this type of journalism fails 
in its supposed fourth estate role, by directly aiding the hegemonic 
political power.
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Introduction
Moral panic has been developed as a concept within sociology and came to greater 
attention after Stanley Cohen’s 1972 book on Folk Devils and Moral Panic. This detailed 
the often irrational, but widespread fear that something or someone was a threat to 
the values, safety and security of society. It is something that is often exploited by 
politicians and journalists, where public panic can be operationalised as a means of 
social and political control. 
Moral panics tend to have a tendency to serve the interests of the hegemonic 
political and economic order (Welch, Price, & Yankey, 2002). In this regard, Zollmann 
(2017, p. 1) notes that “with the ascendance of liberal democracy, propaganda activities 
have vastly increased. […] Because of its societal importance for public opinion 
formation, the news media constitutes an obvious channel for the dissemination of 
propaganda”. The mainstream media tends to be very supportive of the hegemonic 
global liberal democracy1 narratives and its intention to retain its power, rather than 
acting as an independent mechanism to check and balance that centre of power. 
A lot of research is from a sociological perspective, involving cases at a tactical 
or operational level of analysis. The present study intends to look at the issue and 
practice of moral panic from a strategic overview and through the lens of mass 
communication in order to understand the political why and how of the current moral 
panic concerning mainstream news media coverage of the Russian “threat”. What is 
the logic of the Russian “threat”, and are there any “cures” suggested in mainstream 
media coverage? 
The first step in the paper is to deal with the issue of identifying the myths that 
are projected as reality, and separating fiction from fact in mainstream journalism. 
One of the key brand myths is the concept of the fourth estate, where mass media 
and journalism serve public interest by challenging political interests. The following 
section seeks to define and clarify the theoretical motivations and considerations 
involved in moral panic. In the third section, the mainstream mass media content 
involving the coverage of Russia is analysed in order to reveal the nature of the “logic” 
of the reporting in order to understand whether it fits the conceptual criterion to be 
worthy of being labelled as a moral panic. 
Mainstream Journalism and News: Between Myth and Reality 
Branding is a standard philosophy and practice in the contemporary business and 
political environments. It is considered to be an indispensable aspect of organisational 
activity, depending on the conceptual underpinnings and the execution of the 
practical approach, it can be the difference between success and failure in attaining 
organisational goals and objectives. In way of a basic definition of the term and its 
implications, the following provides an overview: 
1 Liberal democracy here is understood and defined as being those who favour the values found in 
multiculturalism and globalisation.
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Branding is the process by which companies differentiate their products from 
their competition. In developing a unique identity, which may include a name, 
packaging and design, a brand is developed. In developing and managing this 
unique identity, the branding process allows organisations to develop strong 
emotional and psychological connections with a product, goods or service. This 
in turn, eases the purchasing decision. Branding affects stakeholder perceptions 
and the marketing task is to ensure these perceptions are positive (Franklin, 
Hogan, Langley, Mosdell, & Pill, 2009, p. 33). 
The above fits with Brown’s (2016, pp. 13–14) understanding that branding helps 
to simplify and distinguish a product or service from all of the other offers in existence 
and competing for attention and consumption, it reduces confusion through initiating 
expectations and creating associations among the customer/user base. A brand 
is a significant step in the road to creating and maintaining an enduring mutually 
reciprocal political relationship between the messenger and the audience. Newman 
(2016, p. 92) understands brand, from the point of view of political application, as 
a mechanism that connects via the policies and issues represented as well as 
through the personality traits possessed. A series of steps are used by marketers in 
order to embark on establishing a brand. The first step is to build awareness through 
communication concerning a particular product or service on offer, which is likely to 
increase engagement and interaction. Step two concerns positioning of the product 
or service, once the consumer is aware of it. This is an attempt to differentiate it from 
its competition. The third step is about establishing a brand after awareness and 
positioning are implemented. Then automatic associations and assumptions are 
connected to the brand of a particular product or service (Newman, 2016, p. 112). When 
a brand is established, when can a particular brand stand out from its competition? 
There are three different aspects to be examined when evaluating the strength 
of brand value. Differentiation is used by a communicator to distinguish a product, 
service or organisation from competing brands, and thereby be able to position itself 
more ideally to enable better reach and connection with the target audience. A brand’s 
visual identity is a key aspect in helping an audience to better identify the difference 
and believe in it. Credibility of a brand is an icon of trust, with the intention of helping to 
develop a loyal following. An organisation’s credibility is achieved by its ability to live 
up to its promise(s). Authenticity is gained by matching words and deeds. 
The current approach to branding is a very pre-meditated exercise in seeking 
to project the positive aspects and strengths of what is being branded and 
communicated. The established brand of journalism carries with its connotations 
and expectations associated with the notion of the fourth estate. Myth-making is 
managed in an idealised and utopian understanding of journalism as a profession 
and what its priorities should be mixes idealised ethical concepts and ideal 
pragmatic practice. McNair (1998, pp. 19–20) defines the function of the fourth 
estate as being “an independent institutional source of political and cultural power 
which monitors and scrutinises the actions of the powerful in other spheres”. This 
is tied to classical liberal theory that postulates the press as a defender of public 
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interests and a watchdog on the workings of government. The term was credited as 
originally being coined by Edmund Burke in the late 18th century, and subsequently 
gained ground from the 19th century (Franklin, Hogan, Langley, Mosdell, & Pill, 2009, 
p. 84). This sets the tone for the idealised notion of journalism’s role. One of the 
popular myths of journalism is its supposed power: “For all of this tumultuous history, 
we hold fast to a vision of the powerful impact of the press, for good and bad. It is 
an old story, already a common theme in the 19th century” (Shaya, 2012). However, 
the presumed power is increasingly being called into question with some saying 
journalism is merely a public record of events as they unfold (Ibid.). Simultaneously, 
it is impossible to deny that if journalism affects the audience, though, then it does it 
not from the calculating viewpoint but following moral sentiments; thus, it is hard to 
determine the level of premeditation involved. 
Obviously, at its most basic function, journalism is the process of uncovering 
information and disseminating that information via media of mass communication 
(TV, radio, newspapers and the Internet). It is also conceived as a form of monologic 
communication (Franklin et al., 2011, p. 124), although this understanding is 
questionable, due to the fact that it cannot exist without the involvement of the 
mass audience into the media content. There is also a great deal of myth and 
symbolic power associated with journalism through it be associated with the nation; 
the brand of the fourth estate as such relates to the ideal functioning of journalism 
as a critical social institution. The elements of journalism as defined by Kovach 
and Rosenstiel (2007) include: journalism’s first obligation is to the truth; its first 
loyalty is to citizens; its essence is a discipline of verification; its practitioners must 
maintain an independence from those they cover; it must serve as an independent 
monitor of power; it must provide a forum for public criticism and compromise; it 
must strive to make the significant interesting and relevant; it must keep the news 
comprehensive and in proportion; its practitioners have an obligation to exercise 
their personal conscience; citizens, too, have rights and responsibilities when it 
comes to the news. A contradiction of the current news environment has been 
noted, in the age of the 24-hour news cycle, where the population is constantly 
bombarded with information. Yet in spite of this, the public remains quite uninformed 
of events, trends and processes in their environment (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2011). 
Following this, what is the connection between the ideal of the fourth estate and 
mass communication?
The act of communication is vital to not only being human, but also for guiding 
social interaction. As such, it generates a number of dilemmas, such as the morality of 
the act of communication. This implies the pursuit of ethical practice insofar as doing 
the “right thing”, and an adherence to a certain social duty and moral responsibility 
(Bivins, 2010, pp. 2–3). Currently, though there is an increase split of perception on 
how journalism explains its public duty and how the public interprets their actions. 
Rhetorically, it is still held as being a “sacred” value of journalism, but public belief and 
trust is on the wane. Why is this seemingly the case? To be understood, this needs to 
be explained by the contemporary challenges and changes faced by contemporary 
journalism and journalists, not to mention the public. Often journalism and media are 
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deemed as being an essential element of a healthy democracy. These arguments, 
however, are often misleading and definitely missing context to be meaningful. But 
the “relationship between media and democracy also depends on the existing state of 
the media and of the market, and indeed on the state of actually existing democracy 
in each individual context – where context is likely to be state-led because of the 
prevailing dominance of state legislatures but not state-bound due to globalisation” 
(Fenton, 2014, p. 31). 
One of the global trends observed has been the incremental concentration 
worldwide of mass media ownership into fewer and fewer hands. As such, the trend 
of concentration of mass media outlets into fewer hands has a potentially negative 
effect on level of transparency and accountability in a political system. Baker 
(2007, pp. 6–37) argues strongly for maintaining diversity and plurality with regards 
to the media ownership. The three main reasons given are: 1) to maintain a more 
democratic distribution of communicative power; 2) democratic safeguards – by 
preventing a monopoly of communicative power to mask abuses of political power; 
and 3) the availability of evidence should never be the sole determinant of the content 
of investigations, which refers to the use and abuse of information dominance, and the 
subjectively selective use of information. When mass media concentration does occur, 
then the results can be stark. 
Schisms in wider society are also being mirrored in the mass media and 
journalism. The schism of the contemporary media and information environment 
is symptomatic of the wider splits and fractures in global politics and society that 
is formed along value and norm-based projected realities. In turn, this negatively 
influences the professional standards of journalism, and manifests in a number of 
tangible ways within media content and behaviour. One of these aspects is found in 
the ethics of activism, where journalists as activists are likely to continue to proliferate. 
The crucial question is raised, when are journalists agenda-driven activists, and 
when are they investigative journalists with a valid cause? In turn, this leads to the 
next ethical question of interpretation and opinion. “The era of news objectivity as ‘just 
the facts’ is dead and gone. Interpretative journalism grows” (Ward, 2014, p. 51). This 
necessitates understanding the separation and implications of commentary, opinion, 
analysis, and facts.
What is mentioned above has caused moments for reflection on the future of 
journalism in the academic community. It has been pointed out that traditionally 
journalism was studied from the point of view of a technological, government, corporate 
or educational perspective. But what is really needed is to look at it from the point of view 
of journalists, because there is no journalism without journalists (Mosco, 2009). There 
has been a long history of future predictions on “crises”, trends, and developments 
in the mass media, and as some academics have pointed out, these are often wrong 
(Curran, 2010). Among the warnings of the gradual death of professional journalism 
(McChesney, 2003, pp. 3–10), some academics argue that journalism is not heading 
for extinction, but rather evolution (McNair, 1998). Namely that the dominant model 
of journalism that existed in the 20th century, which concerned a trained professional 
communicating objective and validated content to the audience, is undergoing change. 
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This fits with the views of other academics that speak of a decline and renewal in 
news media with the emergence of “neo-journalism”, which speaks of journalism 
adapting to the changing environment as “non-professionals” begin to take over and 
are assisted by progress in mobile communication technologies and newly created 
news media outlets carrying the content produced (Giles, 2010). The changes that 
are taking place within contemporary journalism are sometimes referred to as being 
a “crisis” (McChesney, 2003; Young, 2010), where a crisis is understood as being an 
extra-ordinary situation that is potentially harmful. This in turn often causes moments 
to pause and ponder ethical (Ward, 2005) and normative (Schudson, 2001) issues as 
an underlying cause, but also a possible cure (Woodstock, 2002). At times, there is 
a tendency to look back to perceived “golden” periods in history as a guiding force to 
overcome the “crisis”, and thus prevent any transformation. 
But these transformations do not really account for why the changes are 
currently occurring. Journalist and author Andrew Fowler attributes the “decline in 
journalism” to the following reasons: 1) mainstream media disconnect (in terms of 
quality/relevance of information product and declining public confidence); 2) the 
loss of money and power by news media; 3) failing business models; 4) acting 
as echo chambers for powerful interests (Tapp, 2015). Academic Howard Tumber 
(2001, p. 95) explained that journalism was coming under “attack” from two 
distinct sources/areas: 1) pressure from owners and media conglomerates, which 
has exacerbated traditional problems with professional news output; and 2) new 
forms of political and government communication with the public. In meeting these 
challenges, different media outlets have attempted different solutions to overcoming 
the challenges and obstacles, which some observers describe as a “splintering” of 
the fourth estate from a model that was viewed as being homogenous (Rusbridger, 
2010). Given the reasons for the decline of journalism as we know it, how does this 
impact upon the quality of contemporary journalism? Contemporary journalism is 
much less critical of the “official” state line that is encapsulated within the practice 
of news management (Esser & Spanier, 2005), and is prone to exaggeration for 
economic gain and publicity. One avenue that can achieve both goals simultaneously 
is through the creation of a moral panic. 
Moral Panic
“Moral panic” was developed as a sub-discipline within the field of sociology, it has 
come to have a very profound effect upon the language and culture of debate through 
the practice of journalists and politicians (Garland, 2008, p. 9). The idea of a moral 
panic is that it is a mechanism of creating change through manipulating perception 
and opinion. Its origin as “a concept” was first used by Cohen (1972) to describe 
orchestrated and mass mediated public campaigns aimed at generating fear of visibly 
identified “folk devils” (Franklin et al., 2011, p. 152). This is not to say that a moral panic 
is necessarily something that is tangible, but rather the promise of a risk or threat. 
Moral panics are intended to serve as a means to enable a change in law, policy or 
current practices, which is justified as being necessary to “protect” the public and 
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the common good (Franklin et al., 2011, p. 152; Krinsky, 2013, pp. 1–2). There is an 
observable process when a moral panic is manufactured:
• an individual, a group or something is identified as being a threat to safety (the 
“enemy”), values or interests;
• that threat is simplified and distilled to an easily understandable form in the 
mass media. Distortion of reality allows for symbolisation and “prediction”;
• a construction and exaggeration of public concern primary and secondary 
definers of panic, much emphasis on what may or could happen; 
• elevation of public panic and an accompanying demand to do “something”;
• government or legal authorities have a freer hand to implement policy to address 
the “threat”; 
• panic results in some form of tangible or intangible social or political change and 
then goes into “remission” (Franklin et al., 2011, pp. 152–153). 
The above aspects of the process of creating a moral panic illustrate the role 
of concern, generating hostility, forming consensus, fomenting disproportionality, 
and creating volatility (Krinsky, 2013, p. 7). Marsh and Melville (2011) argue that 
the central idea of a moral panic is based upon the presence of a disproportionate 
reaction to a particular behaviour or event. From a sociological perspective, Critcher 
(2008), argues that the analysis of moral panic requires the connections to the 
themes of discourse, risk, and moral regulation. Critcher goes on to suggest that 
moral panics should be conceptualised as being forms of discourse as the discursive 
formations dictate “who has the right to speak, on what terms and to which ends” 
(Critcher, 2008, p. 1139). The result of joining Critcher’s three elements is “redefining 
moral panics as extreme forms of risks discourses as integral to the process of moral 
regulation” (Critcher, 2008, p. 1140). Garland (2008, p. 9) notes that we live “in an 
age of exaggeration, where the mass media regularly converge on a single anxiety-
creating issue and exploit it for all its worth, the utility of negating, deflationary riposte 
is perfectly apparent”.
Moral panics also need to be visualised by the target audience in order to create a 
sense of fear in that group, which are quite often used as a distraction by the dominant 
hegemony during periods of socio-economic hardship. “In sum, social interventions that 
ignore the roots of violence while creating coercive forms of control and scapegoating 
unpopular people are the legacies of a moral panic, becoming embedded in the social 
order long after the initial wave of public anxiety has subsided” (Welch et al., 2002, p. 23). 
It is a matter of creating a “folk devil” in order to justify a “cure”:
Crucially, the theory [of moral panic] has, over the years, drawn attention to the 
importance of empowering folk devils so that they or their representatives can 
challenge the cycle of sanctions and social control. Pressure groups, lobbies, 
self-help and interest groups have sprung up across the country and effectively 
positioned themselves as authoritative sources of comment and criticism. They 
now contribute to the shape of public debate, playing a major role in contesting 
what they perceive as dangerous stereotypes and popular misconceptions 
(McRobbie & Thornton, 1995, p. 572). 
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The above text relates to the positive role of moral panics in being able to contest 
the power of the hegemonic status quo. However, this can be reverse engineered 
too. Instead of being a tool to contest the hegemonic power, it can also be a tool of 
the hegemonic power to crush any possible challenge to its position and consolidate 
specific political interests by using the moral panic (Burns & Crawford, 1999). This 
is done by invoking dangerous stereotypes and popular misconceptions in order to 
enforce and bolster sanctions and social control. The hegemonic power also places 
itself as the monopoly of commentary, and therefore to control the shape of the public 
debate by the creation of a threatening “folk devil” as a means of political and social 
control. This can often take place during some form of socio-economic crisis and 
public discontent with the system. Critcher (2009) equates the role of moral panic with 
the desire to compel moral regulation. However, moral panic may also be used as 
a catalyst for other tasks, such as political regulation. This is to be understood as 
creating an environment of fear and caution, in which the inhabitants are compliant to 
the will and the needs of the hegemonic political power. 
Contemporary Mainstream News Coverage of Russia: The Ultimate Moral Panic?
To make sense of something it is necessary to be able to identify and scrutinise the 
individual components. There are a number of different tools for the analysis and 
sense making of examples of text. One of the tools is through Content Analysis, 
which involves the quantification of different elements in text. It seeks frequencies 
of certain words in certain genres, and can track these over times in order to identify 
change. Argumentation Analysis focuses upon the structure of argumentation used, 
which is linked to the wider approach of rhetoric. Narrative Analysis involves seeking 
to explain a “common-sense” understanding of how the world works through a study 
of the components that make up a narrative. Discourse Analysis has a purpose to 
study issues related to power and how they are linguistically constructed in order to 
understand actions (Boréus & Bergström, 2017, pp. 7–8).
The tool chosen for the analysis of the text in this paper after considering the above-
mentioned alternatives is Qualitative analysis of ideas and ideological content – an 
approach that focuses upon intentional action. In this regard, ideologies are understood 
and analysed as consisting of ideas that guide the actions and interactions that constitute 
a society with its institutions, social relations, and power relations. The aim is to identify, 
interpret, describe, and classify the ideological content in thought and language (Boréus 
& Bergström, 2017, p. 7). The texts for analysis in this paper have been collected over a 
long period (some four years since the Euromaidan events in Ukraine) and have been 
manually narrowed down to some 40 pieces of work. This includes mainstream media 
articles, media monitoring articles, and policy papers by think tanks. 
Information and knowledge production are key components, which influence the 
nature of public debates through managing public opinion and perception of events 
and processes in the physical environment. One of the key components in shaping the 
information environment are media outlets and journalists, which can be associated with 
the mythical brand of being a fourth estate. However, some former members of this group 
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are much more critical of their role. Former BBC news producer Kenneth Payne went as 
far as to characterise contemporary media as “indisputably an instrument of war”. This is 
because military (and political) conflicts are heavily dependent upon carrying domestic 
and international public opinion (Payne, 2005, p. 81), which is very evident in the quality of 
media reporting of the current tensions, real and imagined, between Russia and the West. 
The environment has been captured well in a satirical blog – A Media Primer on the Art 
of Writing Russian Scare Stories. Ten new “rules” of journalism were suggested: 1) there 
is no need to apply the standards of journalism, such as credible and verifiable sources; 
2) truth and credibility are not necessary; 3) make any claim, not matter how outlandish; 
4) add submarines to the story to give it more “Soviet-era” creepiness; 5) play on peoples’ 
fears; 6) use the word Kremlin as much as possible in the story; 7) use Russian military 
aircraft in the story, and make sure the context is left out; 8) minimise or withhold certain 
facts from the story; 9) be very selective on what you report, least there be confusion on 
who the good and bad guys are; 10) create your very own reality (Slane, 2015).
Although the main focus of the paper is from events in 2014, such as those on 
Crimea, which were taken as a low point in relations between Russia and the West, 
there is plenty of evidence to suggest that relations were already in the process of 
plummeting before this milestone. From 2014, there has been a plethora of material 
published by think tanks and other organisations that promote the idea of a political, 
cultural and/or Russian military threat, which is often used as a pretext and justification 
for the act of “self-defence” through increasing the defence budget and enacting extra-
ordinary measures (Darczewska, 2014; Berzins, 2014; Lucas, 2015; Shirreff & Olex-
Szczytowski, 2016). The period of see-saw warm and cool relations has seen periodic 
and recurring bouts of optimism followed by despair. President George W. Bush 
famously saw something he liked in President Putin’s eyes in 2001. Then in 2008, the 
world was apparently shocked by the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia War. Although, 
the signs were already there, and the likely direction of those relations was to worsen 
between the West and Russia given their very different political and policy trajectories 
(Sakwa, 2008). There was an attempt to “hit the reset button” in 2009. What are the 
headlines and media content telling the public about the current Russia “threat”? 
A lot of speculation, assertion and assumption exists in the mainstream media’s 
reporting of the Russia “threat”, which was noticeably increased in “quality” and 
quantity during the 2016 US Presidential Elections, and their aftermath. An opinion 
article compared and asserted what the Russians allegedly did was every bit as bad 
as the Japanese sneak attack on the Pearl Harbour base on 7 December 1941, as “an 
act of war nonetheless, a sneak attack using 21st century methods”. Then the author 
finished her article with the assumption that “Russia must indeed be laughing” (Tumulty, 
2018). This ending is designed as a means to invoke a little extra public outrage at the 
thought of not only being “attacked” and ridiculed as well. As another block in the liberal 
media’s echo chamber when Friedman chimes in with the promise that our democracy 
is in danger: “President Trump is either totally compromised by the Russians or is 
a towering fool, or both, but either way, he has shown himself unwilling or unable to 
defend America against a Russian campaign to divide and undermine our democracy” 
(Friedman, 2018). The echo chamber was reinforced by the words of Robinson: 
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There it is, in black and white: Trump was elected with the active help of Russian 
President Vladimir Putin. While Putin is not named as a co-conspirator, the man 
behind the scheme – an oligarch named Yevgeniy Prigozhin – is a long-time 
crony known in Russia as “Putin’s chef”. The idea that he would meddle in a U.S. 
election without orders from Putin is ludicrous” (Robinson, 2018). 
Once more, the main message is one of an impending threat that has the potential to 
undermine the values and norms of the American system and way of life.
One article from the LA Times sought to create a story detailing a long history 
of the Soviet Union and now Russia as seeking to “sow discord” in the United States. 
The logic of the story is that there were numerous attempts that sought to do this 
historically, but they invariably failed. However, Russia has apparently discovered 
their “silver bullet” with social media: 
Russian operatives couldn’t have asked for better tools than Facebook and 
Twitter to spark conflict and deepen divisions within Americans, experts say. 
Never before could they fan propaganda with such ease and speed and needle 
the people most vulnerable to misinformation with such precision.
The typical style of format of narrative is used, where words that denote uncertainty 
are used, such as “appears” or “allegedly” (Pierson, 2018). Hillary Clinton’s former press 
secretary, Brian Fallon, chimed in with more alarming assumptions and assertions. “It 
seems like the creative instincts and the sophistication exceeds a lot of the US political 
operatives who do this for a living” (Parker, A., Wagner, J., 2018). There is an effort to 
make the Russians and Putin seem like an unstoppable and highly sophisticated force 
that is bent on undermining US democracy by subverting the system. Yet little tangible 
proof is offered to support the highly alarmist claims. Through the use of assertion 
propaganda, these stories offer a number of different suggested “remedies”, which 
include applying further punitive sanctions against Russia and/or removing Trump 
as President. There is also a significant and notable conflation between the measure 
of activity and measure of effect. Even assuming the dubious allegations of activity 
are correct, it does not mean that they necessarily automatically achieve the stated 
effect. A number of discernible buzzwords are often repeated to reinforce the idea of 
the moral panic by emphasizing some key ideas/threats, such as “Russian playbook”, 
“Russian aggression”, “running a sophisticated campaign”, “undermining democracy”, 
“Russia collusion”, “hacking election”, and “destroying US democracy”. Robert Parry 
characterised mainstream US media as being “unctuous” and “unprofessional” in their 
coverage of the issue; not only did they uncritically go with the story, they also attacked 
those who did not in order to create a groupthink bandwagon effect (Parry, 2017a). 
However, there is an ever-growing narrative of evidence and opinion that seeks to 
debunk what has come to be known as Russia-Gate – the alleged collusion of Russia 
in electing Donald Trump as President of the United States. 
There are a number of sources and people that are pushing back against the moral 
panic of the Russia threat narrative through deconstructing its logic, argumentation, 
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and evidence. One of those sources appeared in a mainstream media outlet, The 
Guardian, where the author begins with “Pundits and Democrats ascribe to a handful 
of bargain-basement Russian trolls all manner of ability – including orchestrating 
a coup d’etat”. As part of the deconstruction, Frank mentions that the advertising 
budget for the 2016 US Presidential Election was US$9.8 billion and the alleged 
Russian Facebook trolls spent US$100,000, which supposedly was the most effective 
in “hacking” the election (Frank, 2018). Frank openly states that he believes that the 
reporting on the issue has been consciously and deliberately exaggerated, which is 
one of the markers for identifying a moral panic. 
A number of key witnesses have also cast doubt upon the assertions of Russian 
interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election. One such occasion occurred when 
House Intelligence Committee Chairman Devin Nunes (R-Calif) stated in an interview 
that he was “up to speed on everything I have up to this morning. No evidence of 
collusion.” He went further to suggest that there were members of the US intelligence 
community and the FBI that are leaking information in order to compromise the 
Trump presidency (Savransky, 2017). Michael Morell, the former Acting Director of 
the CIA, an endorser of Hillary Clinton who referred to Trump as a dupe of Russia 
backtracked. He stated: “On the question of the Trump campaign conspiring with 
the Russians here, there is smoke, but there is no fire, at all” (Dilanian, 2017). Some 
media outlets published scepticism of the Russian propaganda narrative too, such 
as when the shadowy front group PropOrNot2 accused hundreds of journalists and 
outlets that did not take the official mainstream political and media narrative as 
“spreading Russian propaganda.” The headline of the New Yorker spoke openly of the 
doubt being expressed – The Propaganda About Russian Propaganda (Chen, 2016). 
PropOrNot attempted to shape the information and knowledge environment by not 
only perpetuating the official Russia moral panic, but also attempted to silence any 
form of public dissent or divergence through character assassination. As George 
Orwell noted back in 1945 in The Freedom of the Press, “at any given moment there 
is an orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed that all right-thinking people will 
accept without question […] Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy finds 
himself silenced with surprising effectiveness”. 
There has been a growing sense of dissatisfaction that the mass media and 
journalism have become “an extension” of the official government narrative and 
other interest groups, rather than a voice of objective reason and public interest, 
the author linking the Russia-Gate narrative to the fake news phenomena (Hannan, 
2018). Renowned investigative journalist, Robert Parry, noted the use of character 
assassination against those people and outlets (through labelling them as “Russian 
moles”) that challenged the “orthodoxy” of the Russia threat moral panic. He also 
noted a logic that he described as being often missing in the alleged Russian “hack” 
of the presidential election. In particular, he pointed to discrepancies in applying logic 
and evidence, such as the relatively minor and insignificant sums of money allegedly 
being used to run their “sophisticated” influence campaign (Parry, 2017b). Even people 
that are normally highly critical of Putin and the Russian government, such as Masha 
2 http://www.propornot.com/p/home.html
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Gessen, characterising the Russia-Gate saga as destructive politics making use of 
a conspiracy theory approach (Glasser, 2017). This criticism has not stopped the 
attempt to broaden the scope of the moral panic in the United States by mainstream 
political and media actors, which was witnessed in the aftermath of the Florida School 
shooting when there were assertions that a “Russian ‘bot’ army pounced” in an effort to 
“sow discord” in American society through divisive debates (Frenkel & Wakabayashi, 
2018). Once more, the mainstream media accepts the orthodoxy without question, 
and takes the assertions as reality uncritically at face value and thereby betraying the 
theoretical foundations of good journalism. However, the United States has not been 
the only country to drive a moral panic using Russia as the folklore devil. 
Another country that has extensively used the Russia “threat” as the basis of a 
moral panic is the United Kingdom. Some stories are timed for significant times of the 
year, such as the Christmas-New Year period, which is associated with festive family 
activities. A story that emerged at this time was an alarmist one that featured the Royal 
Navy needing to be sent in order to intercept and escort Russian naval ships. On 
the surface, the story implies that the Russian Navy violated British territorial waters, 
except for one small tract – “Royal Navy frigate HMS Westminster was sent to monitor 
four Russian vessels over the weekend as they passed close to British waters” (Miller, 
2018). In other words, there was no real crisis or breech of international law, rather 
a constructed moral panic. The threatening “predictions” of leading members of the 
British government have also be quoted without any additional analysis or critique on 
numerous occasions, such as former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson’s assertion that 
Russia is “full of dirty tricks”, and has the ability to disrupt UK politics with hacking. 
This led to discussions on how to defend against these hypothetical attacks (Wintour & 
Slawson, 2017). This news coincidentally appeared at a time when there was a debate 
as to whether to adopt secure on-line voting as an option. More recently, the former 
Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson warned that “Russia could cause thousands and 
thousands and thousands of deaths in Britain with an attack which would cripple the 
UK’s infrastructure and energy supply” (Farmer, 2018). As with the previous cases, 
there was no supporting evidence to back the assertions, and the announcement 
came at a time when the defence budget was being reviewed. One of the more bizarre 
cases was the assertion that Russia hacked BREXIT, which actually came well after the 
vote and only emerged at the time of the US presidential elections in November 2017 
(Burgess, 2017; Galeotti, 2017; Smith, 2017). The same style of rhetoric, reasoning 
and logic used in the US presidential election was used in BREXIT too, in an apparent 
attempt to link the two events together in a global super-conspiracy theory in spite of 
the obvious discrepancies, such as the chronological disjunction of the two events. 
The moral panic of the Russia threat is much more widely and globally spread, 
from the Dutch Referendum on a trade deal with Ukraine and elections (Lagerman, 
2017), to “looming” invasions of Ukraine (Baldor, 2014), the French Election (Daniels, 
2017), the German elections (even though German intelligence found no evidence) 
(Knight, 2017), the Mexican elections (Garcia & Torres, 2018), and even that Putin 
gave orders to attack US troops in Syria (Peters, 2018). All of these stories shared 
the trademark approaches to communicating the moral panic in-line with the US 
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presidential model, with the various alleged risks to societal norms and values, the 
buzzwords used, different “remedies” offered depending on the objective (usually 
revealed by the specific timing and circumstance of the Russia “menace”). As 
noted by Glenn Greenwald, “every empire needs a scary external threat, led by a 
singular menacing villain, to justify its massive military expenditures, consolidation of 
authoritarian powers, and endless wars” (Greenwald, 2018).
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this paper a question was posed: What is the logic of the Russian 
“threat”, and are there any “cures” suggested in mainstream media coverage? Before, 
this is answered in full, the bits of the complex puzzle need to be brought together 
in order to make sense of the bigger picture. Firstly, is the role of journalism and 
the mass media. This institution has managed to create a branded myth around 
itself as being a fourth estate, an institution that checks and balances the political 
power in the name of public interest. However, there are concerns and evidence 
that journalism’s role has become co-opted by economic and political interests. 
This is precisely because of the assumed power to influence perception and shape 
public opinion. The mainstream mass media are indelibly tied to the interests of the 
hegemonic system of liberal democracy acting in the capacity as their information 
gatekeeper and watchdog. 
Currently, that system of liberal democracy is experiencing a multi-levelled crisis 
in terms of public trust and legitimacy owing to what has been labelled as being the 
populist challenge. This has been seen in the US elections when Trump beat his rival 
and the anticipated winner (by mainstream politics and mass media) Hillary Clinton, 
when the favoured liberal contender was beaten by someone that rhetorically stood 
against the liberal system. There were also similar challenges found in BREXIT, the 
French and German elections. Another problem of contemporary politics is found in the 
competition for increasingly scarcer governmental financial resources. As a result, a 
common communication strategy seems to have been developed using a “cookie cutter” 
approach in order to attain these political and economic objectives. After some years of 
not being the global folklore devil, Russia has been re-elevated to this status, which may 
be in part through the ability of the moral panic communicators to link the supervillain 
brand of the Soviet Union from the Cold War to the Russian Federation. Thereby, the 
brand has some pre-existing level of recognition and status to the target audiences. 
Rather than taking the strategy of a longer term and somewhat unpredictable 
path of either reforming the system of a reasoned and rational form of communication, 
a shorter-term approach of using emotionally based messaging that intends to induce 
fear in the target audience. When fear is induced, the logic works differently insofar as 
there is less critical reflection on the quality of the logic and evidence being presented. 
Therefore, inducing a moral panic can adequately meet the organisational objectives. 
Traditionally, moral panics have been associated as a means of ethical or social 
regulation and control within society. This study presents an indicative case where 
moral panic is used to regulate and control politics and economics in a given society 
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or system in order to fend off challenges to their continued hegemony and in order to 
justify policy that may otherwise be difficult to pass. 
Franklin et al. (2011) identified the progression of a moral panic, which can 
be easily applied to this case. Firstly, a threat is identified, in this case Russia and 
Putin. Secondly, the threat is distilled to an easily understandable form by the 
mass media, which can be seen in the uniform rhetoric and lexicon used globally, 
e.g. a “sophisticated campaign” or “undermining democracy”. Thirdly comes the 
construction and exaggeration phase, whereby Russia is elevated to the status as 
a global threat and mega folklore devil. The next phase is to create a demand to 
do something; one such example is the demand by some sections of US society to 
impeach Trump for “Russian collusion”. This creates the context whereby the actor(s) 
responsible for the moral panic have a freer hand at policy, such as deploying troops 
to Central and Eastern Europe. There is an evident effort to try and defend the viability 
of the moral panic from attack and deconstruction, by targeting those individuals and 
organisations that openly challenge the legitimacy and credibility of it, which is done 
by including them as being willing assistants to the “attack” on society and its values. 
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